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Showing Their True Colors? 
How EU Flag Display Affects Perceptions of Party Elites’ European Attachment 
 
Abstract 
Evidence suggests that incidental national flag exposure activates nationalistic feelings, and that 
incidental exposure to the EU flag can affect citizen attachments to Europe. However, we know 
little about what inferences citizens make based on the EU flag when they see it displayed by 
parties in an electoral context. To test the expectation that this display affects citizens’ 
evaluations of party elites’ EU attachment, we conducted a large scale experiment embedded in a 
Swedish survey in which respondents were exposed to communications from one of the two 
main Swedish parties, containing or not containing the image of the flag. We find that simple 
visual display does little to move perceptions. However, if citizens perceive that a particular 
party displayed the flag, then they are more likely to evaluate its party elites as more attached to 
Europe.  
Key words: EU flag; EU attachment; party elites; visual display; perception  
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Imagined communities, such as states, need their members to develop a sense of common 
identity to firmly establish their legitimacy (Anderson, 1991). Group identity increases the 
subjective value of oneself, group members, and the group itself (e.g., Hogg, 2006). Thus, 
national identities help forge positive bonds among citizens and to the political system, which in 
turn foster long-term political stability (e.g. Norris, 1999). National identity is often linked to 
visual symbols such as the national flag. Exposure to this symbol activates patriotic and other 
positive, group-centric feelings (Butz, Plant, & Doerr, 2007; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008; 
Schatz & Lavine, 2007) and can influence electoral support (Kalmoe & Gross, 2015). 
As dramatically illustrated by the recent “Brexit” vote in the U.K., the development of a 
common identity among European Union (EU)1 citizens has been difficult, given the EU’s 
temporal recentness and cultural, historical, and linguistic diversity. Such an identity may, 
however, be a prerequisite for citizens’ acceptance of the EU’s political power (Carey, 2002). 
EU elites have therefore attempted to cultivate an EU national identity, in part by promoting a set 
of nonverbal symbols for the community.  
Over the past few decades, symbols like the European flag, European map, and European 
anthem have become obvious signs of the EU’s physical presence (Manners, 2011, p. 253). 
Among them, the EU flag has been the most successful in gaining popular recognition and 
support. Ninety-five percent of EU citizens recognize the flag, over 70 percent believe it stands 
for something good, and over 80 percent believe it to be a good symbol of Europe (Standard 
Eurobarometer 77, 2012). Research has shown that “adherence to EU symbols such as the flag” 
forms an integral part of the positive affective component of European identity (Boomgaarden, 
Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011, p. 247). Europeans are likely to find themselves exposed 
to the EU flag (or an image of the flag) in their daily life, as it features on most if not all 
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European and national official buildings, European-level media communications, car plates 
across Europe, and European Union coins and notes.  
 Previous research has provided diverging evidence as to how citizens react to the EU flag 
when observed in public. On the one hand, incidental exposure to the flag in media coverage 
enhances feelings of European identity (Bruter, 2009). This result mirrors the effects observed 
for national flags in general (Butz et al., 2007; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008; Schatz & Lavine, 
2007). Other studies have found, more specifically, that the EU flag affects community identity 
only when associated with some EU-related benefits, and this effect is relatively small (Cram, 
Patrikios, & Mitchell, 2011).  
For most EU citizens, considerable exposure to the EU flag takes place during European 
election campaigns. In these campaigns, many parties from across Europe choose to display the 
image of the flag in their informational materials, despite not being legally bound to do so. 
Previous research has shown parties that lean pro-European are more likely to display the EU 
flag than those who don’t, and these parties are more likely to do so if a substantial percentage of 
the population is favorable towards the EU (Popa & Dumitrescu, 2015). In election campaigns, 
the flag is overwhelmingly used in a positive manner: only 4 out of 921 parties since 1979 have 
used it in a negative way (Popa & Dumitrescu, 2015, page 4, fn. 3).  However, there has been 
limited research on the public opinion effects of EU flag display.  
Since the flag is widely recognized as a positive symbol of the European community 
(Manners, 2011), understanding how EU citizens interpret its display by national parties is 
important for several reasons. On the one hand, it is clear that political parties play a central role 
in shaping public opinion in general (Zaller, 1992) as well as on European matters (Gabel & 
Scheve, 2007; Ray, 2003). If national parties display this community symbol, the association to 
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the EU may help reinforce the legitimacy of the EU community among voters. At the same time, 
if parties want to use the flag to cater to pro-European voters, then it is important to determine 
the extent to which this symbol can act as a pro-European signal in a partisan context.  
This study therefore explores how citizens interpret the meaning of the EU flag in the 
context of a national-level campaign. More specifically, we investigate whether displaying the 
flag in election materials makes citizens attribute stronger EU attachments to party elites. To test 
this proposition, we use a large-scale survey experiment in which Swedish citizens are exposed 
to campaign communications featuring the EU flag from one of the two main Swedish parties, 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Moderates (MP). Below we discuss our hypotheses 
and methodology.  
 
Theoretical background 
The EU flag and positive attachment to the European community 
European citizens have different reasons to feel attached to Europe. Bruter (2003, 2009) 
distinguishes between attachment derived from shared culture and experience with other 
Europeans (the “cultural” side of European identity) and attachment based on shared political 
values (the “civic” component of identity). European visual symbols, including the EU flag, are 
closely linked to the “cultural” side of European identity. Boomgaarden et al. (2011) identify two 
distinct clusters of affective reactions directed at the European community—a positive (e.g., 
pride of being European) and negative (e.g., fear of the EU) dimension. The European flag is, 
according to their evidence, closely connected to a diffuse, positive affect felt with regard to the 
EU. These results are in line with other research on national flags. Schatz and Lavine (2007), for 
instance, also find that the national flag is strongly related to an affective, symbolic attachment to 
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the nation.  Thus, although people may identify with a community for different reasons, flags, as 
visual emblems of national identity, are typically associated with positive emotional attachment 
to a community.  
Empirical evidence consistently suggests that exposure to national symbols activates 
positive, nation-centric feelings (Bruter, 2009; Butz et al., 2007; Kalmoe & Gross, 2015; 
Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008; Schatz & Lavine, 2007). Group identities, in turn, influence 
perceptions of oneself and members of the group (cf. Hogg, 2006; Stets & Burke, 2000). While 
previous studies have largely focused on the impact of exposure to national symbols on personal 
identity and attitudes, in this paper we are concerned with how exposure to these symbols affects 
the image of those who display them. To clarify this point by analogy, imagine that a New 
Yorker walking down the street were to display a pink ribbon in 1991. For that individual, the 
ribbon would be a symbol of group identity as part of those who fight breast cancer. However, 
apart from the select group of New York City runners who used this symbol in 1991, few people 
would take it as an identity cue back then. Twenty five years later, this symbol has become so 
ubiquitous that the display of pink ribbons (or wrist bands, or shoes on athletes) is now a widely 
recognized indication of support for cancer activism, in particular breast cancer.  
Since the EU flag has been forged as a symbol of the European community (Manners, 
2011) and has been strongly linked to positive affect about the EU (Boomgaarden et al., 2011), 
we examine whether party elites can use its display to signal their EU attachment to voters (H1: 
“The direct flag effect”). We focus on party elites rather than other political actors based on 
evidence of their influence on individual political attitudes, including European integration (Ray, 
2003; Steenbergen et al., 2007; Zaller 1992). At the same time, some empirical research has 
found that the EU flag’s symbolic power may not yet be potent enough to always activate 
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feelings of positive identity through simple exposure (see Cram et al., 2011). One way to 
increase the flag’s signal strength may be to increase awareness of its appearance by asking 
individuals to formulate an opinion about whether the flag was displayed in campaign 
communications or not. Thus, we also investigate whether display of the EU flag sends a 
credible signal of party elites’ EU attachment if individuals perceive that the flag was displayed 
(H2: “The perception-mediated flag effect”).  
 
The context of communication 
A memorable image from the 2014 European Election campaign was a UKIP (United 
Kingdom Independence Party) poster depicting an EU flag emerging from the still-burning ashes 
of a Union Jack (UK) flag. This negatively charged display, though consistent with UKIP’s 
strong anti-EU position, is also highly unusual (Popa & Dumitrescu, 2015). In fact, the flag is 
almost always positively portrayed in parties’ manifestos, and it is positively associated with pro-
EU party positions (Popa & Dumitrescu, 2015). This pattern suggests that such a display is 
therefore consistent with a party’s EU attachment.  
Moreover, the more ambivalent on EU matters a party is, the more room there should be 
for the display of the European flag to affect voter perceptions. Previous research finds that intra-
party dissent generates voter uncertainty about a party’s stance on European integration (Gabel 
& Scheve, 2007).  Sweden offers a good opportunity to test the moderating role of party position, 
as the two main parties have different levels of intra-party dissent on EU matters. The Moderate 
Party (MP) is historically known for favoring European integration (Sitter, 2001), with a low 
level of intra-party dissent according to the latest Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et 
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al., 2015). Thus in the case of the MP, displaying the EU flag should only marginally increase 
perceptions of MP elite attachment to the EU, which is already perceived as strong.  
The Social Democratic Party (SDP), on the other hand, is generally viewed as having an 
ambivalent position towards the EU due to the fact that the party has been “seriously divided 
over Europe even since Sweden decided to apply for EC [European Community] membership” 
in the early ‘90s (Raunio, 2007, p. 198). This ambivalence is confirmed by the latest CHES 
study, which placed the SDP close to the middle on the pro/anti EU position scale and noted the 
high level of intra-party dissent—the highest among the eight Swedish parties represented in 
parliament (Bakker et al., 2015). Thus, in the case of the SPD, the positive display of visual 
symbols of EU identity should act as a cue that moves the balance toward more EU-favorable 
perceptions. In short, the display of the EU flag on party campaign materials should have a 
stronger effect on the perception of SDP party elites’ affective attachment to the EU than for MP 
elites (H3: “The party effect”).  
 
The availability of additional information 
Communication research shows across a variety of contexts that individuals infer 
significant amounts of information from visuals: flag cues can activate political attitudes and 
feelings of national identity (e.g. Butz et al., 2007; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008); in the realm 
of facial displays, viewers are able to pick winning candidates based on facial appearances alone 
(Hall, Goren, Chaiken, & Todorov, 2009); and, in the absence of nonverbal facial cues, on their 
general visual demeanor (Spezio, Loesch, Gosselin, Mattes, & Alvarez, 2012). When citizens 
have access to both verbal and nonverbal political information, a few studies have found that 
certain voters rely more on the verbal channel to make decisions (Krauss, Apple, Morency, 
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Wenzel, & Winton, 1981; Nagel, Maurer, & Reinemann, 2012), while others find increased 
reliance on the visual channel (Shah et al., 2015; Shah et al., this issue).  
Thus, we also test whether the presence of additional information about the parties’ EU 
positions moderates the impact of displaying the flag on perceptions of elites’ attachment to the 
EU (H4: “The information availability effect”). Given previous divergent results, we are open 
about the direction of the effect here. The null hypothesis is that exposure to policy positions 
does not affect the signal strength of displaying the EU flag. But it is also possible that the effect 
of the flag gets weaker with the presence of additional information; or, that it is enhanced by pro-
EU policy positions and diminished by anti-EU policy positions.   
 
Experimental design and measures  
The data for this study comes from a national survey experiment conducted by the 
Laboratory of Opinion Research at the University of Gothenburg on a panel of Swedish citizens 
(N = 1,824). The average age of respondents in the study was about 53 years old. Sixty percent 
were men, and 77 percent had completed post-high school education. Technical details about the 
panel from which this sample was drawn are available in Martinsson, Andreasson, Markstedt, 
and Riedel (2013). The study was dispatched to respondents several months prior to the 
campaign for the 2014 European elections, in November and December 2013.  
Design 
To test the capacity of the European flag to signal party elites’ European attachments, we 
adapted the visual cover of the Swedish MP and SDP’s 2009 European Election manifestos 
(Euromanifestos) and based all the information provided to respondents on the parties’ 2009 and 
2004 European programs. We pooled policy information from both years because we could not 
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identify enough quotations in 2009 alone to express both positive and critical positions about the 
EU for both parties.   
The experiment took the form of a fully factorial 2 (flag: present vs. absent)  2 (party: MP 
vs. SDP)  4 (added information: none, EU-positive, EU-critical, EU-balanced) design. The first 
factor was whether or not the campaign materials featured a picture of the EU flag. Specifically, 
in the flag-present conditions, we added an image of the EU flag to the top left of each party-
specific Euromanifesto cover. When present, the flag took only 4% of the cover so as to not 
overlap with any of the other originally present elements. This visual manipulation is illustrated 
in Figure 1. The second factor was the party sponsor: respondents saw campaign materials either 
from the MP or SDP. The third factor was the additional information accompanying the 
manifesto covers, consisting of a short text displayed on the screen. The text factor had four 
levels: some saw an EU-positive text (highlighting the EU’s contribution to solving collective 
problems); some saw an EU-critical text (about the EU “democratic deficit”); some saw a 
balanced text about the EU; and, finally, some groups only saw the visual version of the cover 
with no text. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the study’s 16 conditions.  
Screenshots of the full visual manipulation are presented in Figure 1. The full text 
manipulations are in Appendix 1.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Perception of the flag display. After exposure to the experimental treatment and before the 
outcomes of interest were measured, all respondents were asked whether any symbols had been 
present on the campaign materials they had just seen. They were provided with a list including 
the EU flag. The placement of the EU flag on this list was randomized. To avoid repeated (and 
uncontrolled) exposure to the image of the flag, we restricted respondents’ ability to go back and 
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see the materials again; thus, they had to answer this question based on what they remembered. 
A total of 88% of the sample answered the question (N = 1,616); of these, 70% (N = 1,126) 
answered it correctly. More specifically, of the 848 respondents who were exposed to the flag, 
646 (76.1%) reported seeing it. And of the 768 who did not receive the flag treatment, 481 
(62.6%) correctly reported not seeing the flag.  As visuals are processed largely automatically, 
the question was intended to make individuals think deeper about the visuals and have them 
actively express their perceptions about EU flag display.   
Dependent variables. All respondents next evaluated the party’s “top officials” whose 
campaign materials they had just seen, as opposed to perceptions of the party overall. Top 
officials were simply described as “the party’s leaders and Members of Parliament.” We felt that 
asking respondents to estimate their feelings toward an entity as abstract and complex as a party 
would be cognitively burdensome, and invite measurement error. Moreover, party elites are in 
charge of the parties’ policies, thus their opinions are likely to influence the party direction. In a 
very real way, party leaders do personify the parties they represent. To measure perceptions of 
party leaders’ European attachment, we adapted a question format from the ANES 2010-2012 
Evaluations of Government and Society Study (Segura, Jackman, Hutchings, & American 
National Election Studies, 2012), which was used to measure group perceptions. Respondents 
rated how well the expressions “Feel attached to Europe” and “Feel proud of being part of the 
EU” described the [SD/Moderate] Party’s top officials. These two items were chosen among 
others used by Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) and by Bruter (2009) and included two 
affective terms (“feel attached” and “feel proud”) so as to elicit an evaluation of elites’ affective 
identification with the EU. Our main dependent variable is an affective orientation scale 
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constructed from the ”feel attached” and “feel proud” evaluations given to top officials (alpha = 
0.90).  
Controls. In the early stages of the survey, respondents indicated their level of European 
identity (with a measure used by Bruter [2009]), their support for the EU and attitudes towards 
EU integration (with items from the European Elections Survey 2004, and Schmitt et al., 2009), 
and their party vote intention the 2014 general elections. Demographic information including age 
and gender were also asked. These variables are described in Appendix 2.  
To facilitate interpretation of the results, all variables in our models were rescaled to run 
from 0 to 1. 
Results 
To test the effect of the flag on perceptions of party elites’ EU attachment, we ran a series 
of mediation models (Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2011), as depicted in Figure 2. These 
models allow us to test both for a direct effect of the flag visual display (H1) and for an indirect 
effect through individuals’ perception of the display (H2). Furthermore, as we expect differences 
by party (in line with H3), we run these models separately for the SDP and MP. We also expect 
these effects to vary with the presence of additional information (in line with H4); therefore, we 
run them separately for each condition. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
We start with a simple descriptive table of mean perceptions of elites’ European 
attachments in each experimental condition, as a function of participants’ perceptions of whether 
the EU flag was displayed in the materials they viewed. These simple means, presented in Table 
1, offer an initial indication of the magnitude of effects. Larger values indicate that elites are 
perceived to be more strongly attached to the EU. The table suggests at least two patterns of 
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results: compared to the actual display of the EU flag, the perception that the flag was displayed 
is associated with larger variations in the evaluations of elites’ EU attachment; and, these 
variations are larger for the SDP than for the MP.  
[Table 1 about here] 
To test our four hypotheses, analysis was carried out in MPlus 6.11 (Muthén & Muthén, 
2011) using a series of path models that control for several pre-treatment covariates, such as 
voting for the SPD, voting for MP, European identity, EU support, gender, and age (the full 
results are presented in Appendix 3).2 We present the results separately for the SDP (Table 2) 
and MP models (Table 3).  
[Tables 2 & 3 about here] 
The results show no statistically significant direct effects of flag display on evaluations of 
elites’ EU attachment for either party, irrespective of whether each information valence 
condition is considered separately, or together. Thus, we did not find any evidence that would 
corroborate H1, the expectation that simple exposure to the flag would sends a credible sign of 
party elites’ EU attachment.  
We do however find a statistically significant indirect effect, offering support for H2, 
which assumed that the presence of the flag would have to reach awareness to serve as a relevant 
signal. However, the effects are almost exclusively confined to the SDP conditions. In the case of 
SDP we find an indirect effect of exposure to the flag visual across almost all information 
valence groups. The exception is when respondents were shown an EU-positive text. The 
indirect effect of the flag on evaluations of SDP elites’ attachment holds even if we analyze all 
the information valence groups together. 
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These results suggest that, for those participants who believed the flag had been displayed, 
exposure to this visual symbol of the EU had a positive effect on perceptions of SDP elites’ 
European attachments. At the same time, no such effect is observed for perceptions of MP elites. 
There is an indication of a statistically significant indirect effect of the flag treatment when we 
aggregate all groups. But given that for a relatively large N we only detect significance at p < 
0.10, and the fact that this effect is much smaller than in the case of SPD, we can safely say that 
the indirect impact of the flag on the perceived EU identity of MP elites is at best minimal. Thus, 
consistent with H3, we do find some indication that the signal may be more consequential when 
the party is ambivalent on EU matters, as is the case with the SDP but not the MP, which is 
strongly pro-EU.  
Furthermore, we expected flag effects to vary with the valence of the information provided, 
whether the text was critical or supportive (H4). But our analysis found that the indirect effect of 
the flag on perceptions of SDP elites is strongest in the absence of information about the party’s 
EU positions. This result may also have to do with the text’s valence. None of the positions in 
the stimulus materials were overly critical of the EU (including the EU critical condition, which 
was only mildly negative), and the information valence factor has an independent positive effect 
on perceptions of SDP elites (see Appendix 3).  
Finally, the analysis found that the total effect of the visual display of the flag never 
reached statistical significance. Overall, including the flag visual on the party manifesto covers 
did not significantly move perceptions of party elites’ European attachments. This could be due 
to the relatively limited exposure that each participant received to the stimulus materials, or to 
the fact that while an indirect effect can be observed, perceptions about whether the parties used 
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the EU flag on the cover of their manifestos does not provide a strong enough rationale on its 
own for individuals to update their overall impressions of party elites.  
Discussion 
The EU flag is a visual embodiment of the European community and exposure to it has 
been shown to increase citizens’ affective attachment to Europe (Bruter, 2009). But there has 
been limited research on how citizens interpret the meaning of this symbol when they see it 
strategically displayed by parties. Previous research shows that parties influence public opinion 
in general (Zaller, 1992)—and attitudes towards the EU in particular (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen et 
al., 2007). Given the prominent role that national political elites play in the construction of a 
common European identity, it is important to understand the extent to which voters infer 
European attachments from the display by parties of the EU flag on their campaign 
communications. The aim of this paper was to provide a first test of this effect.  
Using data from a large N survey experiment in Sweden, we found that displaying the EU 
flag can influence voter perceptions of party elites’ EU attachment for parties with an ambivalent 
position toward the EU, such as the Swedish SDP. However, the display itself does little to move 
these perceptions; rather, it needs to be accompanied by the perception that the party actually 
displayed the EU flag. We also find that this indirect effect is strongest in the absence of other 
information, but further research is needed to establish more precisely how the valence of 
information affects evaluations of elites’ EU attachment.  
While we find only indirect effects for flag display, these results may be due to the 
limited exposure to the flag that respondents received in the study. Due to practical constraints, 
we could not make the flag larger than about 4% of the cover image overall and we were not able 
to present repeated exposures to enhance recall accuracy. Admittedly, these conditions are quite 
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artificial with respect to real campaigns, where symbols are featured more prominently and 
repeatedly. Thus, our study ends up being a conservative test of the hypothesis. In a real 
campaign, the effects of EU flag display on perceptions of party elites should be stronger. 
Moreover, the national context in which we tested for flag effects adds to the 
conservative nature of the test. While the level of EU contestation in Sweden has never reached 
the highs of other countries that have produced anti-EU parties (such as UKIP in the UK), 
Sweden’s main parties have also been split on the benefits of this membership since joining the 
EU in 1995 (Raunio, 2007). Moreover, in addition to its national identity, Sweden also has a 
strong regional identity as part of the Scandinavian Peninsula. Thus, Sweden may be a tougher 
than usual case to test for the signaling power of the EU flag on perceptions of party elites’ 
European attachment. Results may be stronger in the case of founding members of the EU 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), for example.  
The results also provide some guidelines for practitioners involved in the design of 
European campaign promotional materials. They suggest that playing on EU symbols to signal 
party leader attachment to the EU may work but only for parties that do not have a clear pro- or 
anti-EU position to begin with. Moreover, what matters most is whether voters believe the 
symbol was displayed; thus, to send an effective signal, campaign managers must ensure that 
voters pay close attention to the visual aspect of their electoral message.   
Far from settling what inferences citizens make when exposed to the EU flag in a 
campaign context, these results point instead to the need for further research. So far, studies of 
the impact of European symbols have mainly focused on how exposure to these symbols in the 
media influence the public’s sense of European attachment, and what the flag means to 
individual citizens as part of a larger political community. This paper suggests that the EU flag 
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display in a political electoral context can signal EU attachment on behalf of those who display 
it. Thus, the EU flag display by groups recognized as opinion leaders, and that individuals 
identify with, such as national parties, could potentially play an important role in forging a 
stronger EU attachment. Future studies should further specify the optimal context for this signal. 
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Table 1. Average effects of EU flag display on evaluations of party elites’ EU attachment 
 
EU flag present Perception of EU flag display Evaluation of elites’ 
EU attachment 
  SDP MP 
No Not displayed  0.643 0.803 
No Displayed 0.701 0.791 
No Did not answer 0.589 0.806 
    
Yes Not displayed  0.619 0.763 
Yes Displayed 0.696 0.813 
Yes Did not answer 0.659 0.786 
Note: The dependent variable measures respondents’ evaluations of elites’ EU attachment on a 
0 to 1 scale. Larger values indicate stronger attachment.   
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Table 2. Path analysis results, SDP group 
 
 
   Causal effects 
Model 
(N) 
Outcome 
(R2) 
Determinant Direct 
(SE) 
Indirect 
(SE) 
Total 
(SE) 
SDP,  
no text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.301) 
Flag display 1.034*** 
 (0.194) 
      –   1.034*** 
(0.194) 
(N = 216)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.150) 
Flag display  -0.017 
 (0.036) 
 0.060** 
(0.022) 
 0.043 
(0.032) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
0.058*** 
 (0.019) 
      –  0.058*** 
(0.019) 
SDP,  
EU–balanced text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.205) 
Flag display   0.837 *** 
 (0.197) 
      –  0.837 *** 
(0.197) 
(N = 205)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.188) 
Flag display  -0.023 
 (0.030) 
 0.030** 
(0.015) 
 0.007 
(0.028) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
  0.036* 
 (0.016) 
      –  0.036* 
(0.016) 
SDP,  
EU–critical text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.246) 
Flag display 1.019*** 
(0.214) 
      –  1.019*** 
(0.214) 
(N = 195)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.139) 
Flag display  -0.026 
 (0.035) 
 0.047** 
(0.022) 
 0.020 
(0.030) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
 0.046** 
(0.019) 
      –  0.046** 
(0.019) 
SDP,  
EU–positive text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.301) 
Flag display  1.330*** 
(0.205) 
      –  1.330*** 
(0.205) 
(N = 209)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.150) 
Flag display -0.020 
(0.032) 
 0.027 
(0.022) 
 0.006 
(0.028) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
 0.020 
(0.016) 
     –  0.020 
(0.016) 
SDP,  
all text conditions 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.236) 
Flag display  1.023*** 
(0.097) 
      –  1.023*** 
(0.097) 
(N = 825)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.169) 
Flag display -0.024 
(0.017) 
 0.041*** 
(0.010) 
 0.017 
(0.014) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
 0.040*** 
(0.009) 
      –  0.040*** 
(0.009) 
Note: Unstandardized estimates, standard errors in parentheses.  
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.005 
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Table 3. Path analysis parameters, MP group 
 
   Causal effects 
Model 
(N) 
Outcome 
(R2) 
Determinant Direct 
(SE) 
Indirect 
(SE) 
Total 
(SE) 
MP,  
no text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.334) 
Flag display  1.216***      
(0.261) 
      –  1.216***      
(0.261) 
(N = 189)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.104) 
Flag display  0.035      
(0.032) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
 0.031 
(0.028) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
-0.003      
(0.014) 
 -0.003      
(0.014) 
MP,  
EU–balanced text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.247) 
Flag display  1.075***      
(0.209) 
      –  1.075***      
(0.209) 
(N = 190)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.036) 
Flag display -0.037 
(0.035) 
  0.013 
(0.020) 
-0.023 
(0.029) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
 0.013 
(0.018) 
      –  0.013 
(0.018) 
MP,  
EU–critical text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.212) 
Flag display   0.928***    
(0.195) 
      –  0.928***    
(0.195) 
(N = 210)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.050) 
Flag display -0.045      
(0.035) 
 0.021 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.021) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
  0.023      
(0.017) 
      –  0.023      
(0.017) 
MP,  
EU–positive text 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.357) 
Flag display  1.318***      
(0.221) 
      –  1.318***      
(0.221) 
(N = 196)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.134) 
Flag display -0.015      
(0.030) 
 0.024 
(0.018) 
 0.009 
(0.024) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
  0.018     
(0.013) 
      –  0.018     
(0.013) 
MP,  
all text conditions 
Perception of flag display 
(R2 = 0.261) 
Flag display  1.090***      
(0.103) 
     –  1.090***      
(0.103) 
(N = 785)      
 EU attachment 
(R2 = 0.059) 
Flag display -0.017 
(0.017) 
  0.016* 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
  Perception of 
flag display 
  0.015* 
(0.009) 
      –  0.015* 
(0.009) 
Note: Unstandardized estimates, standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.005 
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Figure 1. Visual manipulation  
 
 
 
 
Note: The top row presents the original party materials, the middle row presents the party materials with 
the added EU flag to the left corner, and the bottom row presents a screen shot example of the full 
manipulation. In this example, the text valence is positive (see complete translation in Appendix 1). 
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Figure 2. The path analysis model 
 
 
 
  
Perception of EU 
flag display 
Actual EU  
flag display 
Perceptions of 
elites’ EU 
attachment 
Controls 
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Appendix 1. Text manipulations 
The texts were directly extracted from the 2004 and 2009 Euro-Manifestos of the two 
parties. They were introduced as “Highlights from the Party’s previous European Election 
Program/ Manifesto.” 
 
I. SDP 
a. EU-positive 
i. Swedish 
EU är ett fredsprojekt. 
EU främjar global fred och säkerhet, för människovärde och demokrati både i Europa och 
globalt. 
EU underlättar kampen mot arbetslöshet, miljöförstöring, och andra saker som ingen nation kan 
lösa på egen hand. 
Vi vill fortsätta EUs utvidgning. 
ii. English translation 
The EU is a peace project. 
The EU promotes global peace, safety, dignity and democracy on our continent and across the 
world.  
EU allows for greater support in the fight against unemployment, environmental degradation, 
and other things that no nation can solve alone.  
We want to continue the EU enlargement. 
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b. EU-critical  
i. Swedish 
EU är inte tillräckligt öppen, demokratisk och jämställt. 
Europa bör lägga större värde på människor än på det internationella kapitalet. 
EU bör göra mer för att bekämpa ungdomsarbetslösheten och bidra till att skapa sysselsättning. 
EU bör göra mer för att bekämpa skatteflykt och ekonomisk brottslighet. 
ii. English translation 
The EU is not sufficiently open, democratic and equal.  
Europe should place more value on humans than on international capital.  
The EU should do more to fight youth unemployment and help create jobs.  
The EU should do more to combat tax evasion and financial crime. 
 
c. EU-balanced 
i. Swedish 
EU främjar global fred, säkerhet och demokrati på vår kontinent och i hela världen. 
Samtidigt bör EU själv bli mer öppen, mer demokratiskt och mer jämställt. 
EU ger större stöd i kampen mot arbetslöshet, miljöförstöring, och andra saker som ingen nation 
kan lösa på egen hand. 
Men EU måste också göra mer för att bekämpa ungdomsarbetslösheten och bidra till att skapa 
sysselsättning. 
ii. English translation 
The EU promotes global peace, safety and democracy on our continent and across the world.  
At the same time, the EU should itself become more open, more democratic and more equal.  
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EU allows for greater support in the fight against unemployment, environmental degradation, 
and other things that no nation can solve alone.  
However, the EU must also do more to fight youth unemployment and help create jobs. 
 
 
II. MD 
a. EU-positive 
i. Swedish 
EU har säkrat fred, frihet och demokrati i ett Europa som tidigare slets av återkommande 
konflikter och krig. 
Genom EU, Sveriges värderingar om frihet, fred och demokrati har en större inverkan på 
världen. 
Den ekonomiska krisen och klimatutmaningen visar att många av de frågor som är viktiga för 
Sverige endast kan lösas genom ett starkt europeiskt samarbete. 
ii. English translation 
The EU has secured peace, freedom and democracy in a Europe that was previously torn by 
recurrent conflict and war.  
Through the EU, Sweden’s values of freedom, peace and democracy have a greater impact in the 
world.  
The economic crisis and the challenge of climate change shows that many of the issues that are 
important for Sweden can only be addressed through strong European cooperation. 
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b. EU-critical 
i. Swedish 
EU måste bli mer jämställt, med positioner lika delas mellan män och kvinnor. 
EU har inte gjort tillräckligt för att säkerställa den fria rörligheten för människor och företag. 
Vi motsätter oss alla försök av EU att reglera vårt arbetskraft och att har sina egna 
beskattningsrätt. 
EU behöver en bättre strategi för att hjälpa länder att förhindra massarbetslöshet och tillåta fler 
och nya jobb. 
ii. English translation 
The EU needs to become more equal, with positions equally shared between men and women. 
The EU has not done enough to safeguard the free movement for people and businesses.  
We oppose any attempts of the EU to regulate our labor and have their own taxing powers.  
The EU needs a better strategy to help countries prevent mass unemployment and allow more 
and new jobs. 
 
c. EU-balanced 
i. Swedish  
EU har säkrat fred, frihet och demokrati i ett Europa som tidigare slets av återkommande 
konflikter och krig. 
Samtidigt måste EU bli mer jämställd, med positioner lika delas mellan män och kvinnor. 
Den ekonomiska krisen och klimatutmaningen visar att många av de frågor som är viktiga för 
Sverige endast kan lösas genom ett starkt europeiskt samarbete. 
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Men EU behöver en bättre strategi för att hjälpa länder att förhindra massarbetslöshet och tillåta 
fler och nya jobb. 
ii. English translation 
The EU has secured peace, freedom and democracy in a Europe that was previously torn by 
recurrent conflict and war.  
At the same time, the EU needs to become more equal, with positions equally shared between 
men and women. 
The economic crisis and the challenge of climate change shows that many of the issues that are 
important for Sweden can only be addressed through strong European cooperation.  
However, the EU needs a better strategy to help countries prevent mass unemployment and allow 
more and new jobs. 
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Appendix 2. Study variables 
 
Elites’ European attachment: original question wording “Next we’ll ask how well some phrases 
describe [SD/ Moderate] Party’s top officials and party voters. Which group you’ll be 
asked about first was chosen randomly by the computer.  
Think first about [SD/ Moderate] Party’s top officials. By “top officials” we mean the 
party’s leaders and Members of Parliament. How well does each phrase describe 
them? Select one answer from each row in the grid (5=Extremely well, 1=Not well at 
all).”  
 “Feel attached to Europe”  
 “Feel proud of being part of the EU.” 
MP voter: reported vote intention for the Moderates in the 2014 Parliamentary Elections 
SDP voter: reported vote intention for the Social Democratic Party in the 2014 Parliamentary 
Elections 
EU identity: original question wording:  “Do you see yourself as …?” response categories:” 1. 
Swedish only, 2. Swedish and European, 3. European and Swedish, 4. European only”. 
Recoded into 0 for “1. Swedish only” and 1 otherwise. 
EU good: original question wording: “Generally speaking, do you think that Sweden’s 
membership of the EU has been very positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor 
negative, somewhat negative or very negative?”; response categories:” 1. Very 
positive, 2. Somewhat positive, 3. Neither positive nor negative, 4. Somewhat 
negative, 5. Very negative” 
Age: computed from birth year 
Female: self-reported gender of the respondent, 0: Male, 1:Female 
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Appendix 3. Full model results with controls 
 
Table A1. SDP group 
 
SDP 
no text 
SDP 
EU balanced 
SDP 
EU critical 
SDP 
EU positive 
SDP full 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Flag display effects 
          
Direct  -0.017 
(0.036) 
 -0.023 
(0.030) 
 -0.026 
(0.035) 
 -0.020 
(0.032) 
 -0.024 
(0.017) 
Indirect     0.060** 
(0.022) 
  0.030** 
(0.015) 
    0.047** 
(0.022) 
 0.027 
(0.022) 
  0.041*** 
(0.010) 
Total  0.043 
(0.032) 
 0.007 
(0.028) 
 0.020 
(0.030) 
 0.006 
(0.028) 
 0.017 
(0.014) 
Path coefficients           
Perception of flag display  0.058*** 
(0.019) 
 0.036* 
(0.016) 
 0.046** 
(0.019) 
 0.020 
(0.016) 
 0.040*** 
(0.009) 
Flag display 1.034*** 
(0.194) 
 0.837*** 
 (0.197) 
 1.019*** 
 (0.214) 
 1.330*** 
 (0.205) 
 1.023*** 
 (0.097) 
 
Text effects           
Positive text         0.213    
(0.139) 
  0.068** 
(0.021) 
Critical text         -0.166      
(0.138) 
   0.084**       
(0.019) 
Balanced text         -0.059      
(0.137) 
   0.074**       
(0.020) 
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Table A1. SDP group (cont.) 
 
SDP 
no text 
SDP 
EU balanced 
SDP 
EU critical 
SDP 
EU positive SDP full 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU elite 
att. 
Perception 
of flag 
display 
EU 
elite att. 
           
Controls            
SDP voter -0.058       
(0.328) 
-0.004       
(0.058) 
0.146       
(0.309) 
0.061       
(0.053) 
0.545       
(0.362) 
0.030       
(0.060 
0.084      
(0.332) 
0.054  )     
(0.068 
0.182      
(0.156) 
0.039       
(0.029) 
MP voter 0.235       
(0.254) 
0.025       
(0.037) 
0.573       
(0.308) 
-0.091       
(0.036) 
0.085       
(0.292) 
-0.077 *      
(0.042) 
0.023      
(0.269) 
-0.029       
(0.030) 
0.206      
(0.139) 
-0.041*       
(0.017) 
EU Citizenship -0.407       
(0.282) 
-0.006       
(0.051) 
0.081       
(0.225) 
0.005       
(0.033) 
-0.004       
(0.243) 
0.014       
(0.037) 
0.101      
(0.303) 
-0.051       
(0.042) 
-0.045      
(0.126) 
-0.007       
(0.020) 
EU good 0.209       
(0.325) 
–
0.187**      
(0.058) 
-0.743*      
(0.329) 
–
0.129**       
(0.045) 
-0.163       
(0.328) 
–
0.136**    
(0.048) 
-0.453      
(0.344) 
–
0.142** 
(0.046) 
-0.266*      
(0.161) 
–
0.149**       
(0.024) 
Female 0.199       
(0.209) 
-0.003       
(0.035) 
- 0.035       
(0.201) 
-0.031       
(0.028) 
-0.357*       
(0.216) 
0.025       
(0.034) 
-0.133      
(0.222) 
-0.002       
(0.027) 
-0.075      
(0.104) 
-0.006       
(0.015) 
Age 0.809       
(0.832) 
–
0.359**       
(0.148) 
0.373       
(0.709) 
–
0.333**       
(0.118) 
0.241       
(0.729) 
-0.074       
(0.103) 
0.134      
(0.779) 
-0.164       
(0.098) 
0.476      
(0.366) 
–
0.231**       
(0.055) 
Intercept  0.861**       
(0.084) 
 0.948**       
(0.072) 
 0.780**       
(0.066) 
 0.895**       
(0.066) 
 0.812**       
(0.036) 
𝑅2 0.301 0.150 0.205 0.188 0.246 0.139 0.301 0.150 0.236 0.169 
N 216 205 195 209 825 
Note: Unstandardized estimates, standard errors in parenthesis, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 
Table A1. MP group 
 MP 
 no text 
MP 
EU balanced 
MP  
EU critical 
MP 
EU positive 
MP full 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU 
Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU 
Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
           
Flag display effects           
Direct  0.035      
(0.032) 
 -0.037 
(0.035) 
 -0.045      
(0.035) 
 -0.015      
(0.030) 
 -0.017 
(0.017) 
Indirect  -0.003 
(0.007) 
 0.013 
(0.020) 
 0.021 
(0.017) 
 0.024 
(0.018) 
 0.016* 
(0.009) 
Total  0.031 
(0.028) 
 -0.023 
(0.029) 
 -0.023 
(0.021) 
 0.009 
(0.024) 
 -0.001 
(0.014) 
Path coefficients           
Perception of flag display  -0.003      
(0.014) 
 0.013 
(0.018) 
 0.023      
(0.017) 
 0.018     
(0.013) 
 0.015* 
(0.009) 
Flag display 1.216***      
(0.261) 
 1.075***      
(0.209) 
 0.928***      
(0.195) 
 1.318***      
(0.221) 
 1.090***      
(0.103) 
 
Text effects           
Positive text         -0.257*      
(0.151) 
0.011      
(0.021) 
Critical text         -0.346**      
(0.144) 
-0.033*      
(0.018) 
Balanced text         -0.451**      
(0.149) 
0.016      
(0.020) 
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Table A1. MP group (cont.) 
 MP 
 no text 
MP 
EU balanced 
MP  
EU critical 
MP 
EU positive 
MP full 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
Perception 
of Flag 
Display 
EU Elite 
Att. 
           
Controls           
SDP voter 0.947*    
(0.489) 
0.050      
(0.046) 
-0.044      
(0.348) 
-0.033      
(0.051) 
0.028      
(0.275) 
0.003      
(0.037) 
-0.044      
(0.327) 
0.022      
(0.033) 
0.168      
(0.157) 
0.000      
(0.019) 
MP voter 0.701      
(0.377) 
0.081      
(0.055) 
0.333      
(0.292) 
0.039      
(0.046) 
0.184      
(0.275) 
0.013      
(0.052) 
0.688      
(0.481) 
0.041      
(0.048) 
0.417**      
(0.158) 
0.039      
(0.024) 
EU Citizenship 0.197      
(0.351) 
0.022      
(0.040) 
-0.236      
(0.286) 
-0.011      
(0.048) 
-0.431      
(0.281) 
0.040      
(0.042) 
-0.140      
(0.276) 
0.017      
(0.038) 
-0.175      
(0.137) 
0.014      
(0.020) 
EU good -0.336      
(0.499) 
-0.167**      
(0.054) 
0.420      
(0.339) 
-0.067      
(0.043) 
0.194      
(0.333) 
-0.129**      
(0.052) 
-0.535      
(0.364) 
-0.156**     
(0.042) 
0.040      
(0.173) 
-0.123**      
(0.023) 
Female 0.222      
(0.242) 
0.058*      
(0.030) 
-0.205      
(0.208) 
0.023      
(0.030) 
-0.251      
(0.198) 
0.026      
(0.033) 
0.405      
(0.228) 
-0.068**      
(0.025) 
0.002      
(0.104) 
0.010      
(0.014) 
Age 0.861      
(0.805) 
0.116      
(0.121) 
-0.348      
(0.882) 
0.019      
(0.123) 
-0.253      
(0.670) 
0.024      
(0.107) 
0.134      
(0.792) 
-0.194**      
(0.090) 
-0.051      
(0.371) 
-0.019      
(0.053) 
Intercept  0.761** 
(0.069) 
 0.853** 
(0.077) 
 0.804** 
(0.068) 
 1.003** 
(0.063) 
 0.864** 
(0.034) 
𝑅2 0.334 0.104 0.247 0.036 0.212 0.050 0.357 0.134 0.261 0.059 
N 189 190 210 196 785 
Note: Unstandardized estimates, standard errors in parenthesis, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
  
  
Endnotes 
1 As of July 2016, the European Union comprises the following member countries (in 
alphabetical order): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 
2 Running the same model using the R mediation package yielded substantively similar results.  
